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Abstract 
 This paper revisits Robert Kagan’s “transatlantic discord” thesis 
advanced in his sensational essay “Power and Weakness” (2002) and later 
developed in his subsequent book, Of Paradise and Power: America and 
Europe in the World Order (2003).  In a line of thought popular among neo-
conservatives within the Bush administration after 9/11, Robert Kagan, the 
shrewdest of the neoconservatives, seized the world’s imagination with his 
provocative thesis that revealed the so-called ever growing divide between 
the Atlantic partners.  In this paper, however, I do not tackle this question: 
the source of strain. Rather I argue that the apparent disparity between the 
US and European security strategies in post 9/11 environment does not 
necessarily mean that Europe moved away from the traditional security 
concerns into a post-Westphalian global order.  It is quite the opposite.  
Europe display core traits inherent to the Westphalian state and adopts 
traditional symbols and expressions of the modern state (nation state) such as 
a common currency, passport, flag, national anthem, president, foreign 
minister and embassies.  More importantly, however, the European Union 
(EU) is becoming a security state that combines and coordinates power both 
domestically and internationally (Polat 2012). What is problematic, however, 
is that the EU is not a state. Yet, it is almost always compared to the model 
of the nation-state (Diez, Manners and Whitman 2011).  
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Introduction 
Today we live in a post-Lisbon era. With the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the European Union (EU) aspired to stateness by establishing 
such offices as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, the first permanent President of the European Council, and a 
European External Action Service (a supranational diplomatic corps).  The 
adoption of these state like powers are not consistent with the standard EU 
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practices.  When I was thinking of these developments, I remembered Robert 
Kagan’s famous 2002 article and then 2003 book where he placed 
Americans on Mars and Europeans on Venus; Mars representing power or 
reality and Venus standing for an ideal world or in fact utopia. 
Kagan’s central thesis is that there is a transatlantic gap, which is 
basically a result of Europeans’ decision to take a break from history.  In the 
new post 9/11 world order, à la Kagan, the United States and Europe were 
fundamentally different.  In fact, not only they stopped sharing a common 
worldview, they no longer occupied the same world.  In his famous 
caricature of Americans and Europeans as Martians and Venusians, Kagan 
pointed to the divergent perspectives of the transatlantic partners “on the all-
important question of power-the efficacy of power, the morality of power, 
the desirability of power” (Kagan 2003:1).  Kagan depicted Europeans as 
weak Kantians turning away from traditional power politics that 
characterizes the Westphalian state and “entering a post-historical paradise 
of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s 
‘Perpetual Peace’“ (Kagan 2003:1).  
There is no doubt that Kagan provoked controversy and offended 
Venusians on both sides of the Atlantic.  For neoconservatives, on the other 
hand, his analysis was not particularly novel. He had just stated the obvious, 
and there was no reason to turn a blind eye to the obvious that Europeans 
lacked power and depended on American protection.  For others, however, 
his analysis was a revelation that Europe and America had parted ways long 
time ago; in fact they were just different from the onset.  
On many occasions, Kagan’s thesis was dissected and rebutted.  Not 
only his arguments proved to be theoretically inconsistent proceeding from 
different premises (Henrikson 2003), but also empirical testing of some of 
his hypotheses (in fact, arguments) found no evidence that Europe rejected 
traditional power politics and security concerns in favor of non-coercive 
practices such as negotiation and cooperation.  While many studies pointed 
to the divergent strategic cultures between Europeans and Americans, they 
portrayed a different, a more pragmatic European security that is more 
“realistic” than a more “utopian” US security strategy (Gordon 2003, 
Berenskoetter 2005).  
So using Kagan’s thesis as frame of reference, I am trying to 
demonstrate that the apparent disparity between the US and European 
security strategies in post 9/11 environment does not necessarily mean that 
Europe moved away from the traditional security concerns into a post-
Westphalian global order.  It is quite the opposite. The European Union has 
been moving more and more to the traditional states’ zone. What is 
problematic, however, is that the EU is not a Westphalian state and can never 
be one. It suffers from an existential sort of capabilities-expectations gap 
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(Hill 1993). Yet, ‘despite its innovative character in academic discourse 
significant support remains for the notion that the EU is best considered 
against the model of the nation-state’ (Diez, Manners and Whitman 2011:3). 
A Traditional Security State? 
The tension between the EU’s capabilities as a polity in non-
traditional sense and the demands placed upon it by the international 
environment creates a mismatch or “decoupling” between the EU’s stated 
goals and actions.  The EU has been constantly accused of hypocrisy — 
failing to practice what it preaches.  The paper argues that such inconsistency 
is mainly the result of ‘organized hypocrisy’, a notion developed by 
organization theorists that describes decoupling organizational discourse 
from behavior.  It is, however, no surprise to see the EU moving into the 
more traditional areas because as Meyer argues, the more problematic an 
actor’s identity, the more easily it will adopt the institutional forms 
prevailing in “the script of modernity” (Meyer 2010, 14).   
And we see this decoupling especially in the area of immigration. 
Immigration policy concerns borders and national security.  It still remains 
within the domain of the nation state; its sole responsibility.  Unlike other 
policy areas where nation states are taking the back seat, immigration still 
remains one area where the nation state is exercising the monopoly over 
territory (Benhabib 2005).  Nation states still possess considerable power 
over the formal rules and rights of immigrants. The porous borders for the 
movement of capital and goods are erected as walls when it comes to 
immigrants, particularly illegal or undocumented ones. Immigrants are seen 
as a threat to national sovereignty and integrity.  Borders determine the 
excluded and accepted. As Necati Polat (2012: 137) beautifully puts it:  
The new Europe displays most of the indigenous traits of the modern 
state that are endemically linked to coercion. Largely modeled after the 
nation state, the integrated Europe not only clearly reproduces its violence in 
terms of human security, particularly evident in the treatment of immigrants, 
but is also likely to follow the modern state regarding conventional security. 
The integration à la Fortress Europe reveals most of the tell-tale signs of a 
security state in the making, seeking to combine and coordinate power 
domestically, without necessarily, and once and for all, giving up the 
objective of amassing power internationally, that is, outside the emerging 
European state, and by whatever means. 
In the following part, the historical evolution of the European 
Union’s immigration policy will be analyzed to document the move towards 
a Westphalian state.   
Europe’s Immigration Regime 
Borders and border control belong to the sovereign state. The gradual 
communitarisation of the immigration policy, as Sandra Lavenex argues, is 
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not so much related to the policy seeking goals of the national immigration 
ministers (Lavenex 2006). As I stated above, this is the result of the EU’s 
ambitions to become a state. A brief look at the development of the 
immigration control regime at the EU level would reveal this thesis.  
Although it all goes back to the founding treaties, the Schengen 
agreement of 1985 laid the groundwork for the Fortress Europe. Five EU 
Member States opened their borders and over the years the Schengen area 
expanded to thirty-one countries, including four non-EU countries. That is, 
border controls were lifted at the internal borders, but most importantly 
outside borders were fortified.  
Following the signature of the Schengen agreement, the three pillar 
structure introduced by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) also known as 
the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the third pillar-the Justice and 
Home Affairs was the second step towards the establishment of an area of 
freedom, security and justice.  Under this solely intergovernmental pillar, the 
EU Member states were required to cooperate to provide European citizens a 
safe area.  To this end, new legal instruments were introduced, but these 
were classic traditional intergovernmental instruments falling in the realm of 
international law, namely conventions, resolutions, conclusions and 
recommendations. Title VI of the TEU was devoted to the 
institutionalization of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs.  A 
cumbersome structure often paralyzed the decision making and was mainly 
criticized for being not transparent enough and too complicated.  The 
unanimity procedure, above all, obstructed and delayed the decision making 
process (Maastricht Treaty 1993).   
The Amsterdam Treaty remedied all these ills by introducing more 
efficient, effective and democratic methods and instruments that gave the 
Community institutions a bigger role in the justice and security fields.  
Transfer of these intergovernmental areas to the EC Treaty with Amsterdam 
meant the involvement of the supranational institutions like the European 
Commission, European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. A five year deadline was introduced for unanimity and then 
qualified majority voting was also allowed when adopting measures under 
Title IV. In the new Title IV-free movement of persons, asylum, immigration 
and judicial cooperation in civil matters, the Court of Justice was given the 
jurisdiction:  
if a national court of final appeal requires a decision by the Court of 
Justice in order to be able to give its judgment, it may ask the Court to rule 
on a question concerning the interpretation of the title or on the validity and 
interpretation of acts by the Community institutions that are based on it 
(Amsterdam Treaty 1999).  
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The decisive turning point in the area of freedom, security and justice 
was the Tampere European Council of 1999.  The European Council held a 
special meeting on 15 and 16 October 1999 in Tampere towars the 
establishment of a common asylum and migration policy in the European 
Union.  The Coucil called for the development of a common EU policy to 
include partnership with countries of origin, a common european asylum 
system, fair treatment of third country nationals and management of migrant 
flows (Tampere European Counil Presidency Conclusions).  
Tampere European Council is actually known as the first step in the 
externalization of the EU’s asylum and immigration policy (Lavenex 1999, 
2006), but it should be read as a move towards the securitization of the 
immigration policy.  In the name of the unionwide fight against crime, the 
European Union stepped into the realm of the nation state.  
Conceptualization of the asylum and migration policy in security terms, 
reveals the European Union’s self image as a traditional security state.  This 
move can be linked to the democratic deficit arguments and understood as a 
legitimization attempt. Going back to the decoupling argument uttered in the 
beginning, the EU’s practices are not commensurate with its stated goals and 
objectives.  Thus, the EU is in an existentialist crisis.  Not to mention, the 
sovereign debt crisis that turned into a tragedy and shook the foundations of 
the monetary union.  But what I suggest is that these moves should be read as 
an attempt to reach the EU citizens and fix the so-called democratic deficit.  
The only way out for the EU in its current crisis-struck environment is to 
move to the areas traditionally occupied by the nation state.  This brings the 
EU much closer to its citizens.  As Manners (2011) richly documents in his 
analysis of the symbolism in European integration process, Europeans’ 
recourse to traditional symbols represents its insatiable quest for relevance 
and persistence.  These “invented realities,” as McNamara argues, are the 
cornerstones of the EU’s legitimacy.   The EU’s struggle is not only internal; 
externally the EU has to prove itself as well.  But in a sovereign states 
system, it is difficult for the EU to project itself as an international 
organization, as it is not really one.  So, it develops state-like qualities to 
gain external and internal legitimacy.  
Conclusion 
In a recent New York Times Op-Ed entitled “The Fix for Europe: 
People Power,“ Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Felix Marquardt, co-founders of 
Europeans Now, plea for a truly supranational move to take the European 
Union to the next level by allowing European wide supranational parties to 
run in the next European Parliament elections.  As they suggest, Europe’s ills 
can no longer be remedied with traditional sovereign state tools because they 
are truly European problems: 
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It’s naïve to expect traditional politicians elected for four- or five-
year terms by citizens from within a sovereign territory to adequately address 
issues like resource scarcity, deforestation, chronic unemployment, global 
warming and fishery depletion that are intrinsically global, and whose 
resolution will take decades. 
In search of relevance and significance, the emulation of the nation 
state with the adoption of “Old World Status symbols” would ironically 
cause irrelevance as the authors argue.  To mind the capability-expectation 
gap, the EU should practice what it preaches.  The programs for a more 
competitive and innovative Europe such as the Horizon 2020, Innovation 
Union and Erasmus Mobility Scheme are truly European initiatives outside 
the traditional sovereign state realm. Going back to the initial argument, 
unlike Kagan’s thesis, Europeans are not from Venus; they are from the 
Earth as much as the Americans.  
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